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in Germany slowly began to shift. As this paper will argue, the early reluctance to 
overcome history was not just a social phenomenon, but also a direct consequence of 
democratic power politics. Likewise, the eventual overcoming of history also rests 
upon a democratic framework, that of opposition party politics that facilitated a return 
to Realpolitik in foreign policy.  
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Erst kommt das Fressen, dann die Moral. 

















1.1. Research Questions 
 This paper seeks to answer the question how Germany overcame its World 
War II history and what efforts, if any, had to be made. For this, it will look at the 
impact of the de-nazification period immediately after the end of hostilities and 
analysis its overall impact on Germany. In the second part, it will focus on change 
within Germanys society, contending political and ideological perspectives as well as 
outline how Germany finally managed to overcome history and reconcile with its 
neighbours.  
2.2. Significance of the Research 
Overlooked by many contemporary scholars are the pains Germany had to 
overcome to allow for the regional integration that it has achieved thus far. While 
Germany has managed to incorporate itself into the framework of the European Union, 
strenuous efforts had to be made in order to rebuild regional trust and faith for the 
German nation. Especially in East Asia, the example of Germany is often used to 
discredit Japans Post-World War II behaviour. While certainly understandable from an 
emotional point of view, the conceptions of many on how Germany overcame its 
history is one that is glorified and often perceived as a flawless example of how a 




Yet, the German case is often misunderstood. With many scholars looking 
more at the result rather than the efforts that led to such a conclusion, Germany is 
regarded as a model example, one Japan has to follow if it wants to finally - from a 
non-nationalist Japanese perspective - overcome its own history and be able to build up 
a new and stable relationship with its neighbouring nations. Such a perspective has 
transcended from the public to the political. For example, South Koreas President Kim 
Dae-Jung once commented that, had Japan reflected upon its past like Germany, 
Koreans would have been more inclined of trusting their neighbour.
1
 Looking at the 
evidence however, one is able to find that such an attitude towards the German case is 
fundamentally flawed in its assumption that Germany in the Post World War II period 
was in favour of historical reconciliation.  
 
LITRATURE REVIEW 
Since 1945 many scholars have investigated the German case of historical 
reconciliation. From these, some papers and books stood out due to the relevancey of 
their research and/ or due to their unearthing of new evidence. As such, they will go 
mentioned here.  
 Jennifer Linds book Sorry States remains one of the most important piece of 
literature on Post-World War Two historical reconciliation efforts of Germany and 




outlines various approaches to reconcilliation, using both the German and Japanese 
case to explain why and how one country was more succesful that the other.  
 The Wage of Guilt by Ian Buruma also inspired this research. Burumas piece 
relies a great deal on personal research done by the author and its captivating 
exploration of the German and Japanese attitudes towards historical reconciliation was 
both enjoyable and educational. Although a great deal of his research was not 
applicable to this paper, his thought provoking narrative served well in questioning 
some of my own beliefs and knowledge on the historical reconciliation efforts done by 
Germany.  
 Another book that deserves mentioning was Hitler’s Generals on Trial by 
Valerie Hebert. As the title suggests, her book dealt with the prosecution of Nazi elites 
at the end of the war. However, while dealing primarily with the period up to 1958 and 
focusing on the trials, her work not only served as an informational reference point for 
the judicial procedurings during the intial de-nazification period but also provided an 
explanation of the German psyche in the years of the occupation and after.  
 
THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM 
3. Introduction 
With the unconditional surrender in May 1945, Germany was beaten on 




of allied bombing. Reduced to nothing but rubble, cities such as Berlin, Cologne, and 
Hamburg (131 German cities had been destroyed 75% or over
2
) provided little shelter 
for the starving German populace. The once proud cities of Germany with all their 
history and structures had been reduced to nothingness. As the government was 
dissolved and German soldiers locked into prisoners of war camps, the German 
population faced occupation and an uncertain future. Beaten by an alliance of nations, 
Germany became split into four occupation zones: American, British, French and 
Soviet. The population, especially those in the cities, had not yet have suffered through 
the worst. With little remaining of Germany and even less that was of any value in the 
years straight after 1945, shelter, food and heating became sparse. Rebuilding the 
country would take tremendous effort all the while the occupation forces launched a 
ambitious de-nazification campaign to ensure all traces of the ideology that had 
plunged Europe into a six year long war would be eradicated. 
3.1. De-nazification of Germany 
The war against Germany was not a simple matter of survival for the allied 
powers. For Russia, it was an ideological clash with fascism and communism battling 
for supremacy across the fields of Europe. For Nazi-Germany too, the fight in the east 
was the true war, the one that mattered and the one that had to be won no matter the 
cost. Even until his last days, Hitler believed the west could be won over in joining 
forces against the Bolshevik menace. Victory over Nazi-Germany meant that the 
political system of the Soviet Union had won
3
. For the west, the war was different. 




and subject to a massive submarine campaign with the aim of starving out the island, 
people of the United States never experienced the losses and destruction that would be 
seen across Europe.  
Instead of fighting for survival, the war became a crusade against Nazi-
Ideology and all it stood for
4
. When the war was won, there was no real territorial gain 
for the victorious nations. Instead, under the leadership of the USA the focus shifted 
away from attaining territorial or economic concessions to removing Nazi-Ideology 
from the minds of the German people. This ushered in a period of denazification on 
which unprecedented judicial processes based themselves on. The American forces 
alone arrested and interned more than 110.000 officials by the end of 1945.
5
 
 One could assume that this would be a remarkably easy task. The crimes that 
had been committed during the years of Nazi-Germany were plentiful and well 
documented, even by their perpetrators. Not only was there plentiful proof that 
property of those deemed unwanted by the Nazi authorities had been seized, but 
especially the prosecution of the Jews had been obvious to all. While many would 
claim otherwise, the anti-Jewish campaign in the 1930s was one that made it 
remarkably clear to all that something horrible was about to unfold. Not only did the 
authorities support, plan and carry out these acts, but they also took great pride in 
broadcasting it to the German populace. Those that missed the constant propaganda 
would find it hard to miss the smashed Jewish property, the massed book burnings and 




yellow Jewish star on their cloths) in shops, at work and on the street. In 1945 however, 
Germany society experienced a sudden and all-encompassing attack of amnesia. No 
one had seen or heard anything. No one had done something this cruel. Sure, maybe the 
neighbour had, but oneself? No. 
 This amnesia was not one that the Allied powers cared to indulge. On the 
contrary, it sought to smash and imbed the hard truth into the German mind. In earnest, 
Germans would be transported to concentration camps, both to clean them up 
themselves and to have them face the horrible sight of burned and decomposing 
corpses, the moulding barracks and the mass murder that happened there
6
.  Those that 
could not be transported were forced to watch the sight in local cinemas or via posters
7
. 
For the allies, this was a campaign not only to show and document what had happened 
during twelve years of National Socialism, but it was also part of their campaign to 
impose a collective guilt upon Germans, based upon the idea that even if one had not 
actively supported the Nazis, one had also not actively opposed them and was guilty by 
complicity. 
3.1.1 The Nuremburg Trials 
Part of this campaign saw the western allies banning Nazi-Ideology. 
Additionally and most importantly for the first few years, they were coming down hard 
on those that had played a key role in the establishment of the Nazi-state, those that ran 
its ministries day to day activities and of course the high-profile leadership of the time.  




could be tried. This proved, with no prior legal groundwork, to be more problematic 
than initially envisioned. Over 218 days, 240 witnesses would be heard, over 10,000 
certified statements given, 2,360 documents referred to, and eventually a 16,000 page 
long protocol would emerge
8
. Eventually nineteen out of twenty-two accused would be 
punished, twelve to death and seven to long-term prison sentences; three were 
acquitted
9
. The trials attracted a huge crowd, abroad and in Germany. Situated, on 
purpose, in the German city that had played such an important role in broadcasting new 
German might under Adolf Hitler, now it would host the prosecution of what remained.  
Initially, the trial was somewhat of a relieve to Germans. Whereas the Jews had 
been blamed for the misery of the nation in the 1930s, now a few select would carry the 
blame for the war and the crimes that had been committed during it. Cynicism aside, 
the trials did proof to be of interest to the majority of Germans. In surveys held by the 
American occupation force, an overwhelming amount of Germans would respond 
positively to the trial. In January 1946, 78 per cent of respondents said they had 
followed the proceedings (via newspaper) and at the conclusion of the trial, 78 per cent 
felt that the whole affair had followed a just cause. 76 per cent felt that the sentences 
had been fair, or – interestingly – too mild
10
.  
The process of de-nazifiction in Germany had only just begun. Nevertheless, 
various countries that had experienced German occupation felt little inclination to wait. 
Identifying key German officials during the occupation, trials would be conducted 




exuberant number of judicial verdicts were handed out in absentia, went on to fill 
400.000 dossiers. While these trials focused on French collaboration with the Nazi-
occupation force at home, they also accused German soldiers and officials of having 
committed crimes of various degrees
11
. These trials proved to be a thorn in many a 
Germans mind. Contrary to the Nuremberg Trials, the French trials were conducted 
after the return of sovereignty to the German people and thus provide a more potent 
example of resistance to the idea of prosecuting Germans that had played an active role 
in both the Nazi-Government and the army. The French trials particularly, contrary to 
the Nuremburg trial, targeted soldiers or Germans that played some role during the 
occupation. Just as trials in Germany that targeted the army, these were regarded as 
unjust, unwanted and unjustified. On the whole, soldiers were seen as having obeyed 
orders and having defended Germany, especially against the dreaded Russians, 
committing none of the assumed crimes. For the ordinary German, that counted more 
than the alleged (and later proven) crimes committed by the Wehrmacht.   
 . By the end of the Nuremberg Trials, the mood in the occupied German 
territories slowly turned sour. People started to lose interest in both the proceedings and 
de-nazification as a whole. Reasons for this are multiple, ranging from genuine 
disinterest, over to increasing cynicism over the perceived victor’s justice and finally to 
the conviction that the past had been adequately addressed and the time had come to 
look ahead. It is important to note but perhaps not surprising at all that the closer de-
nazification came to impact the lives of ordinary Germans, the faster they would lose 




3.1.2 Der Fragebogen  
 The notorious Fragebogen (Questionnaire) was probably one of the most 
ambitions projects in the quest to purge German society of National Socialism. 
Unsurprisingly, it wasn’t compulsory. In fact filling out a Fragebogen was a question 
of life and death for some as no ration cards or travel permits would be issued to 
individuals that had not completed the questionnaire
12
. Germans were forced to answer 
the 132 questions of the Fragebogen, detailing wartime activities, political affiliation 
and so on. On a whole, the Fragebogen was an attempt to map out the respondents life 
over the years of Nazi rule in order to determine whether he had been actively 
supporting the National Socialist movement or not. In case that evidence would be 
uncovered or the respondent left some room for interpretation, he or she would have to 
appear before a tribunal. In the end, the verdict would be given according to five 
categories, ranging from ‘main offender’ to ‘exonerated’.  
 The Fragebogen, albeit being an ambitious theoretical framework by which to 
root out the support structures of National Socialism within society, did not do well in 
practice and alienated large numbers of Germans. On the one hand, no clear definition 
or criteria existed to assist those that had to weed through the millions of papers (Dec. 
1945: 13 Million Fragebogen completed) in judging a respondents character and 
wartime action. As Kettenacker points out, when everyone was following the same 
leader, how could one separate the ‘sheep from the goats’
13
?  This led to a large degree 
of randomness, imbalance between regions and made the Fragebogen seem more like a 




 Likewise, German’s lamented that the trials seemed to ignore the reasons why 
some German’s might have been more active then others or whether there were non 
ideological motives for joining the Nazi party. Indeed, little to no effort was made to 
place the motivation of party members into the context of the years 1933 – 1945. While 
some certainly had joined out of ideological conviction, no distinction was made for 
those that had joined in order to secure their jobs and livelihood. The whole affair 
became too much to handle for the occupying authorities, who were beginning to 
understand the depth and complexity of the issue. With the ‘bureaucratic quagmire’ 
taking it’s toll on the resources of the allied powers and with an ever-worsening public 
mood, the whole affair was place into the hands of the Germans themselves
14
. 
3.1.3 Failures of de-nazification 
 Placing judicial powers into the hands of Germans might have sounded like a 
good idea for the allied powers. Not only would this allow the Occupation forces to 
focus on other tasks, but also would give the Germans a shot at redeeming themselves. 
It would not be so. On the contrary, this transition of powers would do little more than 
deliver the coup de grace upon de-nazification. The tribunals became some of the most 
hated and heavily criticised institutions of the time. Up to 50,000 cases were processed 
by 545 tribunals each month, but the whole process was seen to be inefficient at best, 
and corrupt at worst
15
. In many cases, friends, colleagues and acquaintances would 
cover each other’s backs, give false testimonies and even clergymen would speak on 
behalf of the accused, defending him and his outstanding moral character
16




 At the same time, high-profile but well-connected officials went free whereas 
small time office workers would have a hard time finding themselves exonerated. To 
make matters worse, due to the fact that a not-guilty verdict was in essence a post-war 
blanco check and an alibi at the same time, it was not uncommon for judges and 
lawyers that had worked under the Nazi-regime (often handing out politically 
motivated verdicts) to now trial Germans once more, just under a different set of law
17
. 
German’s would refer to the certificates as Persilscheine (Persil was a laundry 
detergent brand, Schein the German word for certificate). By the end of a trial my 
Germans ha joked that the brown shirt of a Nazi had magically transformed into 
sparkling white
18
.   
 Overall, the detaining and questioning of Party members (3.6 million in the 
western occupation zones) led to only 1,654 verdicts which identified the accused as a 
Hauptschuldiger (main offender)
19
, a remarkable small number considering the size of 
the Nazi party. The program ended in 1948 by order of the Americans with little to 
show for it. The next few years did not fare much better. Until 1949, twelve different 
trials took place aimed at industrial elites, lawyers and judges, doctors, diplomats and 
others. All in all, these trials prosecuted over 5000 people with a total of 486 sentenced 
to death
20
. Again, this didn’t sit well with a lot of Germans. Increasingly, Germans 





 Likewise, the trials under German supervision were regarded with little more 
than contempt, both by those that thought of them as unnecessary or unjust and those 
that had previously voiced their support. For the latter, the trials were simply not 
enough and did little in punishing those officials that had truly been engaged in the 
massed deportation of Jews, the concentration camps or forced labour and illegal 
acquisition of private property. This attitude is probably best described by the 
protagonist in Ernst von Solomon’s adequately titled story Der Fragebogen in 1951: 




3.1.4 Success of de-nazification 
 While the shortcomings of de-nazifications have been outlined, this period did 
manage to succeed in one very important aspect.  Its sole success did not lie in the 
actual de-nazification of Germany or holding the chief culprits to account, but in 
establishing a total and complete taboo on National Socialism as an ideology. While it 
is true that National Socialism, the justification of crimes committed by the Nazi state 
and support for it as an ideology was purged from politics and public discourse, I 
would argue that this was not an a complete offspring of de-nazification. De-
nazification and the watchfulness of the occupying forces certainly played a role in the 
implementation of such a taboo, but at the same time the vocal and publicized 
opposition to anything that was regarded, as ‘Nazi’ was a political necessity. Were de-




 As a study by the allied occupation forces shows, support for National 
Socialism remained at an alarming height post war. Even more concerning was the fact 
that it actually grew during the years following 1945 when de-nazification was at its 
height. During November 1945 to December 1946, an average of 47 per cent of 
Germans responding to the American OMGUS survey indicated they felt that National 
Socialism had been a good idea baldy carried out. By August 1947, support for 
National Socialism increased to 55 per cent, remaining at such a level of support for 
another few years.
22
 While one might argue that this was a mere backlash to how the 
trials were carried out and not a deep-rooted sentiment, I would argue differently. True, 
a survey carried out by unpopular American forces could incite more aggressive 
responses, but at the same time one has to acknowledge that during the period of de 
nazification, voicing support for National Socialism could be a serious threat to ones 
personal ‘record’. The fact that up to 55 per cent of respondents responded supportive 
of National Socialism as an ideology shows that little had been achieved or learned.  In 
the ranks of ordinary German’s, quite a lot of support still reigned for the ideology that 
had plunged Europe into a six-year conflict.   
 The matter of fact remains however that mainstream German politics, at least 
publically, did not voice support for National Socialism. Yet, while it made the 
necessary public address to condemn the ideology, it did not spur ahead attempting to 
address the past on the domestic front. Both sides were the result of politics in action, a 




3.2. Victim mentality 
Although going to great lengths in trying to forget their own acts, 
Germans did not forget the past. On the contrary, mirroring Japan, they almost 
instantaneously reinterpreted it by perceiving themselves as the victims. Had Germans 
not endured the years of bombing? Had Germany not endured Dresden? Had Germany 
not endured the Red Army? Even by 1955, the average German would more vividly 
remember the Allied Bombing campaign (Bombenhagel – Hail of bombs) than 
Auschwitz, Dachau or the Holocaust itself. Even the common slogan 'Nie wieder Krieg' 
(Never again a war) was not necessarily one that came out of an apologetic sentiment 
but because one never again wanted to endure the horrors of war. For most, what 
oneself and ones country had done or started during 1933-1945 became a triviality; 
what one had endured became the essence of the discussion.  
This attitude was strong predominantly among those that had lived in the cities 
during the war or those expelled from the eastern German provinces. Between 1945 to 
1947, 69 per cent of Germans east of the Oder-Neisse (Two rivers, the Oder and the 
Neisse, create a natural border between nowadays Germany and Poland) had been 
forced to emigrate by the Russian army and local authorities
23
.  This would have a 
profound effect on German society and politics. 
3.3. Domestic Politics 
Even by the end of 1945 and with the whole political apparatus smashed by the 




too surprising. Both in the east and west, politicians that had served in the Weimar 
Government had lived a quiet life under National Socialism and now emerged older, 
but no less bolder. With most having been forced out of politics when Hitler had 
outlawed all parties safe his own in 1933, few had stayed active in order to contest the 
Nazis. Konrad Adenauer, the first German Chancellor of the new Federal Republic was 
not known to be particular fond of Nazi-Ideology but his resistance to National 
Socialism was not particularly strong either. While he had been detained a few times 
and remained under observation during the years of 1933 to 1945, his actions amounted 
to just about two short prison sentences. While proof that Adenauer had not been 
regarded with much good will by the authorities, he lived an easy live compared to 
those that had actively sought to oppose the rise of fascism in Germany. For them, 
imprisonment was the slightest of punishments. Others, like the Social Democrats Kurt 
Schumacher, Otto Grotewohl and Willy Brandt returned from exile.  
Political parties sprung up across Germany, with the Christian 
Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) emerging as the strongest parties. 
Others, such as the Communist Party (KPD), the liberals (FDP) and many smaller 
parties joined in. Almost immediately, party politics set in. As parties merged, 
splintered and fell into obscurity, Germanys political scene recovered remarkably 
quickly and by the return of sovereignty in 1953, with the Cold War defining the 
national security of the victorious powers that they began to be supported by the 
western allies. This was to be a remarkable shift in priorities for countries that had only 




crimes that had been committed under National Socialism. By the beginning of 1953, 
the de-nazification period had run out of the little steam it had ever possessed. 
 Adenauer was a man who knew how to win an election. In a time in which 
Germany had to rebuild, it required an anchor that would provide strength to carry on. 
Much of his many electoral campaigns would focus upon Adenauers personality, his 
character and what they represented. As small parties vied for support and the Social 
Democrats were hindered by infighting and their inability to attract electoral support 
beyond the working classes, he offered the very quality Germany needed: stability. Yet 
this stability came at a price, a moral one at that for the one thing that upset the balance 
was the question of war guilt, repentance and the Nazi period. Adenauer certainly was 
no sympathizer to Hitler but at the same time he realized the sensitive role Germany’s 
actions during the war played in domestic affairs. He also knew politics and how to win 
elections. As such the hard question, the one’s that should have been asked and 
answered never were. 
This attitude extended to many FRG politicians. Few harboured much 
sympathy for National Socialism. Ousted from office or driven into exile during the 
fateful years of Nazi rule, few had any reason to mourn the collapse of Nazi-Germany 
from an ideological standpoint. On the contrary, some had been imprisoned and had 
suffered at the hand of the fascist authorities. But politics is a game of its own and the 
considerations of democratic rule ensured that few politicians attempted to dwell on the 




As such, getting Germany back on track was a priority and with a people that 
largely perceived themselves as victims, neither Adenauer nor any other politician with 
influence pressed the matter. It turned out that rebuilding a country from scratch was 
easier than moral atonement.  
3.4. The price of democracy 
This was particularly true due to the large influx of German’s from the eastern 
territories. Providing for millions of refugees was a challenge, but at the same time the 
influx of 10 million people that had to be cared for represented a vast pool of voters, 
something that did not escape the attention of any of the political parties in the new 
German state. 
Even before the defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945, the question of the 
territorial future of Germany was one that saw great discussion both at the Teheran 
Conference, Yalta and at Potsdam. With a definite agreement being made in the 
Potsdam agreement, large parts of Eastern Germany up to the Oder-Neisse Line, 
historically the territories of Prussia, were proposed as territorial compensation to 
Poland after the eventual unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. This proved to be 
an easy task in theory since by the end of the war the Red Army had punched through 
German forces and occupied nearly all eastern territory all the way to Berlin, thus 
eliminating resistance east of the German capital. The exodus of the German 
population from the now Polish territories – although a number of Germans remained – 




After 1945, Germans left their homes, either driven out by force or pre-
emptively; abandoning the land their family had lived on for generations. 69% of the 
German speaking population of the territories east of the Oder and Neisse left between 
1945 – 1947. In total this represented more than 11 million Germans, making up 18% 
of the total German population of 65 million (West + East) in 1947. While three 
million would eventually remain in the East, the large majority - eight million - would 




The Western administration under Adenauer refused to accept the Oder-Neisse 
Line as the official border between German territory and Poland. In Adenauers opinion, 
as with many Germans, these territories were by their very essence German and 
nothing but German.  In fact, evidence suggests that a very strong emotional 
attachment to these territories was present in the general population at that time
25
, so 
much so that the CDU under Adenauer used the fear of a territorial loss in its own 
election campaigns. This can be attributed to two factors.  
First, the territories of Prussia, Silesia and Saxony (amongst others) and the 
cities of Breslau, Danzig, Koenigberg, and Stettin were seen to be intrinsically German 
and held great historical value to the German nation. Prussia was both the birthplace of 
some of the greatest Kings in Germanic history and it had also been the driving force 




territories not only meant a loss of land, fields and rivers but it meant that Germany had 
lost the cradle of its own self.   
Second, the exodus of many Germans that had lived in the territories overrun 
by the Red Army into West German meant that the new German state harboured a great 
many people with no real home. Although German by name, they spoke with their own 
dialect, had their own regional culture and a long history of living in the East. They had 
been driven from their own lands either by fear or force and although some remained, 
an estimated fifteen million eventually fled to West Germany
26
. Many of these hoped to 
return one day and reclaimed their homes and land.  
Thus, Germany had both emotional and historic links with the lost territories 
but it was the former that truly catapulted the issue onto the political sphere. Both the 
East and West Germany administration were not too fond of signing off these 
territories after the war. Ultimately the East German administration had little choice but 
bend to the pressure from Moscow and formally agreed to the Oder-Niesse line in 
1950. West Germany would not do so for many years to come. 
3.5. ‘Nazis’ in the Government 
As we will see, by the end of Adenauers administration in 1963, 
relatively little had been done to ‘come clean’ yet Germanys standing in the west had 
remarkably improved. France no longer saw Germany as an enemy, but rather as a 
close partner
27
 and America increasingly focused on the Vietnam situation after having 




was a thing of the past. Of course, this did not mean that Germany was free to act 
without scrutiny. On the contrary, the international community kept a watchful eye on 
German domestic politics. Regardless, effective control on the internal situation had 
long been relinquished. Thus, both German reluctance and a lack of external pressure 
effectively put an end to the early attempts to bring those that had been guilty of Nazi 
crimes or collaboration to justice.  
The de-nazification period in Germany was a short-lived one. While the 
obvious suspects such as Goering, Doenitz and Speer were tried under tremendous 
media coverage the attempts to purge the state apparatus failed miserably. As with the 
Japanese case, the western occupation forces in Germany quickly realised that the 
idealistic idea of purging away each and every one who had been actively engaged in 
the German state bureaucracy during the Nazi-period was one that could not be 
realistically achieved if West Germany was to become a strong ally, rather than a 
burden. Similar to Japan, the new German state and even the occupation forces - both 
West and East - began to rely on the knowhow and skill of lawyers, bureaucrats and 
industrials, all of which had been playing an active role during 1933-1945 in order to 
rebuild the shattered country.
28
 In essence, both countries retained the structure on 
which the leadership had built its success.  
 In the case of Germany, it is a widely held myth that Germany saw a drastic 
turnaround when it came to its political elites. As Ian Buruma states: ‘whereas after the 






this is certainly true in the Japanese case, it is an inaccurate statement that Germany 
completely did away with the leadership that was present during the Nazi years. While 
the ‘big names’ were certainly purged by the Nuremberg Trial, various officials that 
held high positions during the National-Socialist period were able to return to office 
and public prominence.  The return of some of Germany’s World War II political 
elites, those with the memorable names of Albert Speer and Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 
paint a sombre picture. However, these were not the only people that had both been 
successful officials during the war period as part of the Nazi-regime and the new 
German state. With prominent examples right up to the 1980s, one can justifiably raise 
the question how ‘new’ this new German state actually was, as the continuity between 
the administration of Nazi-Germany and that of the Federal Republic was impressive.  
  Several high-profile names exist. Theodor Oberlaender who had supported the 
ethnic cleansing of the Polish population
30
 and had worked in various governmental 
and army positions all over Eastern Europe would - despite strong criticism - become 
Minister for Refugees and Expellees in 1953. With his appointment came an influx of 
prior colleagues whom Oberlaender had worked with during the war all of which, 
including Oberlaender, went through the de-nazification process unscathed. 
Oberlaenders appointment, for all the criticism it provoked was a political move by 
Adenauer who was aware of his new Ministers past. Regardless of this knowledge, 
Adenauer utilized Oberlaender to secure support among the German populace, 
especially those that had been expelled from the eastern German territories
31
. 




raised into a ministerial position post- war. Hans Globke, a co-author of the Nuremberg 
Laws of 1935 that revoked German citizenships from Jews and was the man behind the 
forced adoption of identification names for Jews (Israel for men, Sarah for women) 
would later become Director of the Federal Chancellery for a period of ten years (1953-
1963)
32
. Again this appointment by Adenauer sparked criticism, but again this criticism 
died down relatively quickly.  
 Oberlaender and Globke were no exceptions. Next to Robert Wistrichs Book 
Who’s Who in Nazi Germany, various studies have shown the extend in which previous 
Nazi-officials were able to bypass the de-nazification period with relative ease. A 
recent publication by the Historikerkommission (Historian Committee), Das Amt und 
die Vergangenheit, analyses the actions of the Foreign Ministry during and post-WWII 
shows in excruciating detail how easy some officials were able to resume their posts in 
the 1950s
33
. Almost exclusively recruiting from old colleagues and friends, the foreign 
ministry covered up their own history and made sure its own ranks were exonerated.  
While the average German might have feared the Fragebogen, former colleagues in the 
German foreign ministry could rely on each other to overcome this brief 
inconvenience.  
In all this, the case of Kiesinger is the most noteworthy. Kiesinger, having 
worked in the Propaganda Ministry under Joseph Goebbles as a head of a department, 
was not one with a clean record. The very fact of the matter that Kiesinger was able to 




Germany, just as Japan, still allowed officials that had played an active role in the 
Nazi-Government to rise high. While resistance against Kiesingers Chancellery was 
present and growing, the fact remains that he held office for nearly three years. What 
makes Kiesingers term so noteworthy however is not the simple fact that he had once 
worked in the Propaganda Ministry and then assumed the highest office in the new 
German state, but rather that his success marked a natural progression from Konrad 
Adenauer - who had been the major of Cologne and, while not actively working with 
the Nazi Government was also not actively working against it - over Ludwig Erhard - 
who had also been a governmental official during the war.  It was only until returned 
exile Willy Brandt won the election in 1969 that Germany chose a Chancellor whose 
record was completely clean of the 1933 – 1945 period. 
Kiesinger was no exception but it is the one that casts doubt over the progress 
Germany had made in overcoming their history internally up to 1969. If Germany were 
to elect a man like Kiesinger and largely accept his Chancellery, then how many others 
could have potentially returned to high office? As noteworthy as this is, Kiesinger’s 
loss of the Chancellery in 1969 to Willy Brandt would also become the turning point 
and largely reflect the turning tide within German society. A new group of intellectuals 
(Gunter Grass, Heinrich Boell among others) had emerged, highly critical of Germanys 
Nazi past and prominent in public discussions on the subject. As well as that, a new 
generation of post-war students began to voice their opinions. A more detailed study on 




to hold a public office, it would be him and his electoral defeat in 1969 that would 
mark the beginning of the end for the old guard. 
All in all, Germany’s leadership did not experience a drastic shakeup. While 
the Nuremberg Trials saw to it that the highest members of the Nazi period were 
eliminated from political life – either by death or life-imprisonment - the overall post-
war German government showed continuity from its war time years. While this 
certainly allowed the new German government to reorganize more efficiently and 
enabled a relative smooth progression, it prevented a great many politicians and 
bureaucrats from being prosecuted for the role they played during the Nazi-regime. 
Without a doubt, many of these individuals would have been released in the event of a 
prosecution anyway, but the complete lack of any substantial and systematic judicial 
process not only mirrors the Japanese case, but it also proves that German elites had 
little to no interest in facing the Nazi period.  
3.6. International Politics 
 It gives credit to the political astuteness of Adenauer that he understood that in 
order for Germany to once again play a larger role in international politics, it had to 
present itself repentant and make amends for what it had done. Prior to that however, it 
had to rely on the support of the allied powers and for that too, it had to distinguish 
itself fundamentally from Nazi-Germany and right the wrongs that had been done.  
 In large parts this was a PR campaign through and through. The western 




secondary. This was in accordance to Adenauers motto: No experiments. As much as 
German’s needed stability domestically - and for that the past had to rest - as much did 
the international sphere require suitable proof that things had changed beyond the 
Rheine.  
 For this, Germany agreed to various reparation payments to countries, 
especially with Israel. There was both little choice in the matter as well as the dire need 
to ’get it over with’. Reparations would be substantial, ranging from handing over old 
Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe equipment – the Israeli air force would be partially equipped 
with variants of the German Bf 109s fighter planes
34
 – and actual reparation payments. 
For example, with the 1952 Luxemburg Accords – Reparations Agreement between 
Israel and West Germany – it was agreed that Germany would pay a yearly sum of 
money – in total 3 billion Deutschmark (7 billion Euros) - to Israel over the coming 
fourteen years
35
. To pass it in the German Bundestag, Adenauer had to rely on the 
Social Democrat opposition since his own party was largely divided on the issue.  
  
3.6. Success of de-nazification 
 Within a few years after 1945, the mood in Germany had significantly shifted. 
Whereas in the few months following the surrender, German’ were highly supportive 
of the trials, with time and increasing scope they began to view them less favourably 
and even openly objected to-, and actively worked against them. The de-nazification 




effect, succeeded in establishing the total opposite than it was meant to. Instead of 
acting as a catalyst to address, repent for and overcome the past, it succeeded in 
establishing a strong opposition to just that. 
Nevertheless, Nazi-Ideology, the justification of the Nazi period and 
open statements of support for the regime became a complete taboo in Germany, 
regardless of one’s true opinions on the subject matter. This proved to play a crucial 
part in the decades after 1945 to facilitate an environment in which the past would not 
become glorified but actively prevented just that. This was no temporary knee-jerk 
reaction. Even by the end of the 1980s, this trend would still be running strong. Phillip 
Jenninger, President of the Bundestag since 1984, held a speech in the Bundestag on 
November 10
th
 1988, fifty years after the Reichskristallnacht that had marked German 
history forever.  During this speech he attempted to explain the rationale behind those 
that had supported Nazi-Ideology and, in a neutral tone, explain what had happened 
during the years of 1933-1945. The speech effectively sealed his fate and politically he 
never recovered from it. He was not the only one. Any commentators who dared to 
address the Nationalist-Socialist period had no option but to continuously mention the 
grave crimes the German people engaged in during this time, to speak of atonement 
and call for never ending remembrance. 
This ‘taboo’, although changing overtime, was one that stretched across 
German history since 1945 right into the present, so much so, that current attempts to 




often times controversial subject even in the 21
st
 Century. The Nazi-period became the 
definition of something undesirable, something indescribable and something 
inexcusable. In such a one-sided setting, German politicians, the media, intellectuals 
and later society at large became hypersensitive to any comment relating to the Nazi-
period that carried anything but distain. While open support for Nazi-Ideology became 
a no-go, so did one have to tread carefully when speaking of Germanys past. The case 
of Jenninger emphasizes just this. Germany, the media, intellectuals and international 
commentators would scrutinize any comment made on the Nazi period, so much so 
that, at times, individuals would become the target of harsh criticism not because they 
had openly supported or, more often, excused National-Socialism, but because one was 
perceived to have done so.  
Yet, this taboo not only manifested itself by ensuring German’s would 
refrain from voicing support for National Socialism. It was also a reaction to the 
horrors of war. Ordinary Germans simply did not want to speak of the war, so much so 
that efforts to hold a discussion on the subject matter would often be met with silence 
or scowls.  
 
1963-1973 – TEN YEARS THAT CHANGED GERMANY 
Germanys success in overcoming its own history did not lie in an 




international pressure or the protests of the 1960s. Instead, while such factor might 
have assisted in overcoming history, they lacked in overall lasting impact. As detailed 
in the previous sections, the overwhelming majority of German did not care much for 
the crimes that had been committed by Nazi-Germany. Even twenty years later, with 
the emergence of a new anti-Nazi generation, this attitude prevailed. As well as that, 
international pressure on Germany had been present since 1945. During this time, 
German officials had become quite adept at appearing to make genuine efforts to make 
amends for Germanys past. This included payments to Israel, the returning of stolen 
property and official condemnations of those that openly stated their support for the 
Nazi past. Further and more profound efforts were rare and typically done by 
individuals. Behind the curtain, German society remained unremorseful and even Nazi-
Officials often saw more support and recognition than those that had worked against 
the authorities during 1933-1945.   
 As argued in this part, Germanys success in overcoming history was the 
product of two important factors. First, a new era of Nazi prosecution paired with a 
waning of support for Nazi-officials and an increase in non-conservative politics 
allowed governmental change. Second, newfound interest in historical reconciliation 
amongst part of the electorate supported the reformation of foreign policy and a shift in 




4. A new generation comes of age 
During the mid-1960s, Germany experienced a stark increase in the amount of 
politically active civil activists. Predominantly young, these people had never 
experienced life under Nazi rule (or had been too young to remember it) and had not 
played an active role in the reconstruction of the German economy, state and society. 
By the mid-1960s however, in response to Kurt Kiesinger’s acceptance of the 
Chancellery, a strong counter-movement emerged in Germany. Although they would 
build the basis for the latter 1969 protests in German and also identify themselves with 
the anti-western imperialist movement and anti-Vietnam War protest in the United 
States, their primary concern had been the formation of the Grand Coalition between 
CDU and SPD, headed by Kiesinger, and the attempts to pass a new Notstandsgesetz 
(Emergency Law) allowing the government to restrict the media, rights and freedom of 
movement. The Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (Non-Parliamentary Opposition), 
while factually unsuccessful, set the basis of a new social movement that would shape 
German society and politics from the 1970s onwards.  
Conservative politics dominated Germany until the late 1960s. Adenauers 
authority remained unbroken over many years and he was not one to give up power 
easily. His last years in office were marked by an increasingly stubborn, self-righteous 
and authoritarian governing style. Having presented himself as a parenting figure of 
Germany since 1949, he gradually grew out of touch with his electorate. His landslide 
victory of 1957, at age 81, would both underline his success during the 1950s, but also 




Adenauers CDU won the 1961 election, but he would not govern the full four years as 
he had hoped. Instead, by 1963, he was forced to pass the Chancellery powers to 
Ludwig Erhard who managed to win the 1965 elections over a strengthening SPD only 
to pass power to Kiesinger in 1966
36
. Having to resort to the SPD as a coalition partner, 
the CDU, governing Germany since 1949, was in crisis. Old power structures started to 
crumble, opposition parties began to remerge and the wind of change was blowing. 
Changes on the political sphere were not the only one of the time. Society too 
underwent a fundamental transformation. While the 1950s predominantly saw a 
German populace refusing to face the war and its Nazi past, this would change 
drastically by the mid 1960s. Increasingly young Germans would delve into the Nazi 
period seeking to uncover what had happened and bring those individuals to justice 
who managed to escape prosecution during the 1940s and 50s. Initially, this was not a 
campaign that many Germans supported. In fact, mirroring the early years, parts of 
German society strongly opposed looking at the Nazi period in any more detail. 
Trouble was that those that did, had no inclination of being dissuaded from doing so. A 
young, vibrant, idealistic and sometimes mislead generation had emerged. Now of age 
and politically (or at least ideologically) active, they formed the spearhead that would 
rip open the carefully sewed up past. This generation has seen a lot of literature over 
the years as throughout Europe such movements became visible. While the culture of 
denouncing Nazis (or alleged Nazis) and protesting for the overcoming of history was a 
primarily German element in the 1969 protests, the year saw widespread student 




Some authors have attributed the fact that Germany was able to overcome its 
Nazi past to the emergence of this generation. There is some truth in that. The new 
generation was one highly critical of the past and of their parent’s generation. For this 
generation, it became inexplicable how anyone could have supported the Nazi party 
and after that, failed to oppose Nazi rule once it began to take shape. This movement 
saw a wide variety of activists, from self-styled communists waving Mao’s Red Book 
or shouting ‘Ho-Ho-Ho-Chi Minh’ in the streets, over to pacifist, non-conformists and 
civil activists. Faced with protests that went beyond the previously encountered, 
German politicians and the police force failed to react appropriately. While the protests 
themselves were not unilaterally supported by Germans, the police force in particular 
caused major damage to public opinion by violently breaking up peaceful, albeit loud 
and persistent demonstrations. Numerous cases of police violence became documented 
in the media and the shooting of two students served to underline the perception of 
many students that the Federal Republic was nothing but a police-, if not Nazi state in 
disguise.  
Of course factually it wasn’t. But the students of the 1960s had plenty of 
reason to believe so. In a society showing strong ideological fragmentation between a 
youth demanding major political/ ideological and societal change and an older 
generation seeking to uphold the status quo, one was quick to judge. Both sides saw 
plenty of reasons to distrust each other, which would fuel the ever-deteriorating order. 
The supporters of the 1969 protests were mainly but not exclusively students, 




set a few years before but in a more standardized, simplified and radical form. Some 
saw the Federal Republic as little more than a continuation of Nazi-Germany, 
something they would often and loudly lament. Others felt that the just defeat of 
Germany had been undone by the failure to punish those that were responsible for mass 
killings and the planning and logistics thereof. The fact that many prominent politicians 
and businessmen were able to exonerate themselves with ease and resume their careers 
after the war gave weight to this notion and helped to create the stigma of a Nazi-
Ideology supporting political elite. 
As we shall see later on, the protests had little to no impact on facilitating a 
renewed emphasis on overcoming Germanys past. For that they failed to influence 
policy making. For that the movement was too fragmented, too radical and too 
ambitious. Eventually, after losing public appeal, popular support and Germany had 
undergone major changes, nothing but a small terrorist group the Rote Arme Fraktion 
(RAF – Red Army Faction) remained of the movement that had crippled German 
society.   
4.1. Right Wing Politics Post World War II 
Right leaning conservatisms remained a potent force during the 1950s to 
1960s, also because of the high influx of very traditionally minded forcefully deported 
Germans from the Eastern Territories. Uniting under the BHE - Bund der 
Heimvertriebenen und Entrechteten (League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights) in 




policymaking. Although successful as a small political party in the 19590s, the BHE 
was also able to attain large electoral support in early state elections such as in 1950 
when it won 23,4 per cent of the popular vote in Schleswig Holstein which harboured 
many expelled Germans. Overall, in 1953 the BHE won 5.9 per cent of the general 
election, accounting for 27 seats in the Bundestag
37
. Conservative and with a traditional 
mind-set, it’s cooperation in a Coalition with the Adenauer CDU was guaranteed. As 
mentioned before, Adenauer moved quickly to guarantee the support of the new 
arrivals from the East.  
While cooperating with the CDU, the BHE never let go of its two main party 
principles: Lebensrecht im Westen (Right of living in the West) and Heimatrecht im 
Osten (Right to homeland in the East). This, shaped with anti-communist thought, anti-
Semitism (Hitler had enjoyed great electoral success in the East) and a zealous interest 
in keeping Germany German, marked the BHE out as one of the first political parties 
that catered especially for those that had supported the Nazi-regime. Waldemar Kraft, 
the groups first Leader, recognised this by saying that the BHE would be a party also of 
‘ex-Nazi’ although he went on to stress that these individuals no longer remained 
‘Nazi’
38
. The groups’ usage of language, publicity stunts and posters reflected these 
ideas and resembled the posters of the NS-regime.
39
 Having failed to secure more than 
5 per cent in the 1957 elections, the group was slowly falling into obscurity. Having 
fused with the Deutschen Partei (DP), another right-leaning German party, to form the 




1960s, its influence was weakening with the passing of the older generations. However, 
another more active right wing group was beginning to emerge.  
Just as the left had radicalized over the 1968-1969 period, so had a worrying 
trend emerged between 1965-1968. Founded in 1964, the NPD (National-
Demokratische Partei Deutchlands) became the new ‘Nazi’ party of Germany. 
Whereas most rightwing movements such as the BHE had taken great care in hiding 
any trace of National-Socialist support within its ranks, the NPD was upfront about its 
ideas. In this, it was not the first party to do so. The Deutsche Reichspartei – DRP 
(German Reich Party), founded in 1950 had already been engaged in high profile anti-
Semitic acts.  In 1959, two of its supporters drew Swastikas and slogans (‘Down with 
the Jews! Into the gas chambers!) on to the Cologne Synagogue. Their act encouraged 
others. Within four weeks, German authorities recorded over 470 instances in which 
far-right leaning individuals targeted Jewish property. The DRP was quick to distance 
itself from the perpetrators but its fate was sealed. With its political image tarnished, it 
is dissolved in 1965
40
. 
The NDP benefited. Having and influx of both DRP and GDP members and 
supporters, the NDP portrayed itself as daring, radical and revisionist. While in the 
1965 general election it only gained 2 per cent of the overall vote, conservative voter 
dissatisfaction with the economy (oil shock), the grand coalition and the young 
generation allowed it to successfully enter the Hessian and Swabian Diet in 1966 and 




failing to gain even a single per cent in the next election
41
. Yet, while the overall 
impact of the NPD would ultimately be limited, it and the 1968-1968 protests served as 
a reminder that in times of crisis, extreme ideologies were well able to arouse support 
among voters. 
4.2. The Impact of the Auschwitz Trials of 1963-1968 
In 1958, the Zentralle Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltung zur Aufklaerung von 
NS Verbrechen (Central Office for the Clearing-Up of Nazi Crimes) was inaugurated in 
Ludwigsburg/ Germany. Finding a suitable location had been difficult and even though 
one had finally found a location, the office quickly found itself exposed to violent 
attacks
42
. Regardless of the initial hatred towards it, with the research of the 
Ludwigsburger Office, Germany experienced a new wave of Nazi prosecutions. 
Uncovering various officials that had resumed their work post-1945, the office 
systematically expanded its scope. By 1967, working on 600 difference cases, it had a 
staff of 121 and employed 49 state prosecutors and judges
43
. One of its major 
achievements and a landmark development in itself was the 1963 – 1968 Auschwitz 
prosecution.  
 During this period, three separate trials prosecuted 28 officials, SS-members, 
doctors and concentration camp workers. The first and largest trial lasted just under 
two years, from the December 1963 to a two-day verdict announcement period in 
August 1965. Focusing on 22 cases (accused), the trial with ended with the acquittal of 




which 16 were carried out. Punishment ranged from several years to lifelong prison 
sentences.  The second session, ran from the December 1965 to September 1966 and 
ended in the prosecution of three out of three accused. The third and last session 
occurred between August 1967 to June 1968 seeing two out of three accused sentenced 
to lifelong prison sentences. While the number of accused pales in comparison to the 
overall number of staff that worked and murdered in the Nazi concentration camps, the 
trial was a massive undertaking with the first one alone calling upon 350 different 
witnesses, holding 183 sessions, amassing 124 volumes of court records and a three 
month period to complete the closing documents
44
.    
 Nominally charging individuals with the murder and/ or assistance to murder 
of innumerable political and ethnic victims, the prosecution attracted the attention of 
the media and thus the wider German society. With the uncovering of evidence and the 
testimony of victims, the trial in itself served as an educational tool. It was the first 
time that Germans were confronted consistently with the extent of the Nazis political 
and ethnic purge. Various newspapers reported on the trials, initially with some 
reservation but eventually daily
45
.  The overwhelming amount of evidence not only 
shocked Germans as a whole, but it also prevented vocal support for the accused
46
.  
By the end of the trials, up to 20,000 spectators would have experienced the 
prosecution first hand by attending one of the countless sessions. Many would return 
multiple times and even schools and universities sent their students to sit in the 
courtroom and observe the trial
47




extensively that the trial had become impossible to miss. Die Welt, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, and the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, all major 
German newspapers, published a total of 933 articles dedicated to the trial
48
. In 1964, 
two study groups surveyed the German population hoping to uncover the overall 
impact of the trial. The German Institute for Public Polling (Deutsches Institut fuer 
Volksumfragen) concluded in June 1964 that 40 per cent of its respondents did not keep 
up to date on the Auschwitz trials via newspapers, television or radio
49
. A similar study 
conducted a month later by the Institute of Social science (Institut fuer angewandte 
Sozialwissenschaften) showed that 83 per cent had heard of the trial and 42 per cent 
were able to name the city in which it took place (Frankfurt am Main)
50
.  
While not necessarily evidence of an increase in public awareness (The poll of 
June 1964 specified whether the respondent regularly informed himself via the media, 
not if they knew about it at all), the survey of July shows that the public was very much 
aware that something was in the works, although it might not have been informed in 
depth.  
What is striking is the fact that German opinion on trials regarding the crimes 
of the National Socialist regime fluctuated. While the trials certainly induced a sense of 
disgusted fascination among Germans that followed the trial and as such were able to 
more educate the German people on the crimes that had been committed, they were 
unable to instil a sense of guilt among all levels of society. On the contrary, the 




accused even more from society, thus building a wall between the German people and 
‘the few’ that had committed mass murder. The trials succeeded in captivating the 
German audience, but little more. In 1963, 54 per cent of Germans were against any 
further prosecution and felt that it was time end the whole affair (einen Schlusstrich 
ziehen)
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. This rose slightly to 57 per cent by 1965, the year the first round of trials 
ended. Considering the percentage of people that had officially opposed any further 
trials in 1958 (34 per cent). This was a marked increase. Most notably however is 1966, 




This fluctuation can be attributed to several factors. Prior to 1960, and with 
exception of the Nuremburg Trials, media coverage of trials was less frequent and the 
whole process failed to influence public discussion. Later, Adolf Eichmann prosecution 
of 1961 in Israel (Eichmann, ex-SS Obersturmbandfuehrer by help of the Church had 
fled into Argentinian exile in 1950 and captured by Mossad in 1960 after Fritz Bauer, 
the driving force behind the Auschwitz Trial passed along information to Israel because 
he didn’t trust the German authorities. He was forcefully brought to Israel, tried over 
his involvement in the management of Nazi concentration camps and executed in 1962) 
had been of huge interest to the German public of which 95 per cent indicated that they 
had followed the trial
53







The prosecution of Germans abroad (this had happened before in various 
countries such as France and Poland) was generally not met with positive reception. It 
is thus no surprise that by 1963, a year after Eichmanns execution, over half of 
Germans felt that history should rest
55
. Likewise, the high point of 1965 can be 
associated with the end of the Auschwitz trials. To many Germans the guilty verdicts 
for the majority of accused must have felt as enough to finally close the chapter on the 
Nazi years. The remarkable drop to 44 per cent a year later though would indicate that 
the overall resistance to further trials was not set in stone. The media never paid as 
much attention to the second Auschwitz trial of 1965 to 1966 yet the previous years 
had seen a marked increase in public and political discussion on the matter. No longer 
did the media report of a single trial, but it reported, commented and influenced 
political and public debates on the matter of collective guilt, overcoming history and 
the special responsibility of Germany and the Germans. 
Indeed, the mid-1960s saw a stark divide within Germany between those that 
wanted to press ahead with the idea of Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung and those eager to 
draw a line under the past, thus ending the whole debate. This divide was also a 
political one, with the Social Democrats (SPD) largely in favour of accepting 
responsibility for the Nazi period and the Christian Democrats (CDU) that argued guilt 
was restricted to a few, already punished individuals. It was an open and heated debate 
that ultimately ran in favour of the Social Democrats simply because the existence of 





The Verjaehrungsdebate (Debate on the extension of the limitation period of 
crimes committed by the Nazi-regime) of 1965 portrays this well. Speakers from the 
SPD and CDU would go head to head on historical issues and present varying 
interpretations and convictions about how to address Germans past. For example, Adolf 
Arndt (SPD) commented that after the true face of the Nazi regime had appeared the 
lack of any active resistance – also by him - obliged (‘verpflichtet’) all Germans to 
overcome rather than forget their past and that it was a heritage all Germans shared. On 
the other hand, Rainer Narzel of the CDU argued that CDU the German people were 
not collectively guilty, and that the CDU had ‘been saying this for twenty years and 
would continue to do so
56
’. This debate, running for three days (10
th
 March – 13
th
 
March 1965) eventually saw a postponement of the debate by four years. In 1969 the 
extension period increased to ten years and ultimately terminated completely.  
 Twenty years after the end of the war the process of coming to terms with 
Germanys past had only just begun, even if Ludwig Erhard had told Germans in 1965 
that ‘The post-war period is over’
57
. Conservative voices were overall on the decline, 
also because within twenty years a large portion had died and was thus eliminated from 
the public debate which was more and more shifting towards the young. As a witness 
in the Auschwitz Trials Hildegard Bischoff, widow of Karl Bischoff who had overseen 
the construction of the crematoriums in Auschwitz, emerged evasive and maintained 
that she knew little if nothing about the killing even though she had lived in close 
proximity to the camp. Carl Krauch of I.G. Farben that had used slave labour in its 




workers and internees. When pressed on the question of sick prisoners, he commented 
that such cases would either be send to the camp hospital or the main complex of 
Auschwitz. In reality, or as Krauch implied when he mentioned Auschwitz, evidence 
during the trial proved that sick or injured workers would be killed relatively quickly
58
. 
Students that had followed the trials found, with notable exceptions (some students felt 




 The social-liberal era was beginning to take shape. Educational trips to 
concentration camps became part of the school curriculum, exhibitions of the 
Holocaust opened and memorials commemorating the Jewish victims appeared around 
Germany. The concentration camp of Dachau itself was renovated and designated a 
memorial site even though parts of the camp were demolished
60
. At the same time, 
resistance to the ‘new generation’ was intensifying. The 1968 – 1969 protests had been 
an extreme manifestation of some of the anger that had build up among the young in 
Germany. While losing steam by the end of 1968 and utterly collapsing by 1969, it 
served as a lesson to the young that political and social change could not be achieved 
via sit-ins, protests and violence alone. Instead, society had to be reformed from within 
and political activism rose sharply. Initially, this didn’t facilitate an increase in 
electoral turnout in 1969 over 1965 (Electoral turnout: 1965 - 86.8%, 1969 – 86.7%). 
Due to the Grand Coalition, both major parties had lost the trust of the young but in 








 The 1969 election marked the end of the Grand Coalition. Kiesinger had been a 
controversial figure, not simply because the CDU was hard pressed to portray the 
stability of the Adenauer era but because of his Nazi past. For some Germans, the fact 
that Kiesinger had been able to become Chancellor was unacceptable. A year before 
the 1969 general election this frustration boiled over. Beate Klarsfeld, whose French 
husbands family had been murdered in the concentration camps, confronted Kiesinger 
on the CDU Party conference. After publically slapping him in the face, she was 
restrained and dragged away. Commentators at the time cynically remarked that this 
event was the only moment the CDU wholeheartedly supported Kiesinger
62
.   
 The CDU/CSU lost the 1969 election, but it was not a major victory for the 
SPD. On the contrary, the CDU received more votes than the Social Democrats but 
failed to win the absolute majority. The SPD gained three per cent over the 1965 
election but remained three per cent behind the CDU. The FDP, although having 
suffered greatly due to its liberal shift, fell to 5.8 per cent
63
. Yet, the FDP was no longer 
willing to join with the Christian Democrats, also because it had lost nearly all its 
conservative voices the year before
64
. The SPD under Willy Brandt and the FDP under 
Walter Scheel joined forces. On the 21st of October 1969, parliamentarians elected 
Willy Brandt as Chancellor by a two-vote majority
65
. A consensus looks different but 




a liberal FDP. While Germany remained divided on the issue of history and guilt, the 
debate continued and indeed resurfaced in the 1960s. By that time, those that had been 
dissatisfied with the CDU thus far largely supported the SPD that had struggled to 
extend its influence past the working classes during the 1950s
66
. On this wave of 
political change would come a drastic change in Germanys foreign policy that 
facilitated reconciliation.  
4.3. Political developments 
With Brandt Germany experienced a major governmental shift. While 
considered weak on domestic policy by his critics, he understood Germanys precarious 
position in the heart of Europe. During the years of the Great Coalition, he used his 
position as foreign minister to test the waters for his envisioned Ostpolitik but 
understood that the envisioned change in foreign affairs could only be feasible if the 
CDU lost power. At the same time, together with championed a new President Gustav 
Heinemann championed a new political line of remembrance. In 1970, both delivered a 
speech to the Bundestag in which they broke from the status quo by proclaiming that 
World War II and Nazi rule had been the true deliverer of horror, and not the ‘defeat’ 




Willy Brandt himself was often styled, especially by the time his success of 
Ostpolitik became evident as having broken from conventional wisdom due to his own 




reflected ‘the other half’ of Germany that wanted to engage with its past. While his 
motivations alone would merit discussion and research, this paper will not do so.  
Ultimately the motivation of Brandt to depart from the previous governmental line, 
whether it had been done for electoral success, ideological differences or based upon 
his own beliefs, brought about a new beginning. Had it been done for power, so would 
it reflect poorly on Brandt but would not discredit the German effort as a whole. Had it 
been done out of principle, so would it reflect positively on Brandt but at the same time 
not make the German effort any greater than it had been.  
4.3.1 Germany by 1969 
By 1969, the relations between the FRG and the east were less than poor. In 
fact, official relations between the two German states were virtually non-existent. Still 
following the maxims of the Adenauers period that strongly supported the ideological 
divide between the west and communism, German foreign policy became out-dated. By 
the mid-1960s, West Germany had managed to bind itself and its western neighbours 
into a communal framework. This had not been achieved with ease but the efforts paid 
off and one had to come to mutual agreements with countries such as France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom, Germany was now secure in the West. During the Adenauer years 
and even later under Erhard and Kiesinger, West and East German cooperation or 
dialogue was rare. With both the governments of the FRG and the GDR claiming to 
represent the German nation in its entirety, room for mutual official recognition and 
cooperation was nigh impossible. Under the Hallstein Doctrine, FRG officials even 




into diplomatic contact with the GDR. Although mainly hindering West German 
interests, the Hallstein Doctrine is a potent example of how serious the split between 
the FRG and GDR was during the 1950 and 1960s.  
The Hallstein Doctrine restricted Germany more than it furthered its goals but 
years of conservative rule in Bonn had enforced such a one-dimensional vision. By the 
mid 1960s, criticism of the Hallstein Doctrine was widespread and even existed in the 
United States. Not only did it prevent a dialogue between West and East Germany, but 
it also sabotaged the already lukewarm attempts to build up relations with several 
eastern European countries. Even after 1962 it took Germany another few years and 
governmental changes to finally cut loose its excess baggage.  
In this, Willy Brandt and the SPD/FDP (although it too had proponents of the 
existing status quo and Brandt himself had stated in the early 1960s that official 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line would be treacherous
68
) were instrumental. After 
having succeeded Kiesinger as Chancellor, Brandt promised reform. Next to social and 
political reforms such as and expansion of social welfare, modernization of education, 
fairer wealth distribution and supporting women’s rights, he also enabled young 
German’s to more actively engage in politics. Naturally this increased his popularity 
among the students and young adults but also served to encourage political activism in 
Germany, something that the older generations clearly lacked. The voting age was 
lowered to 18 years from 21, and one was able to run for political office by the age of 






4.3.2 Historical Reconciliation as National Security Strategy 
Although he lacked strength in domestic policy, the Brandt administration 
fundamentally changed Germanys position in Europe. In this it is often regarded as 
groundbreaking. There is certainly some truth in that. At the same tie however, 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik was not exactly revolutionary. Its main difference to the 
conservative foreign policy lay in the fact that it accepted reality instead of embracing 
the increasingly out-dated ideological West-East division. Proponent of Ostpolitik saw 
cooperation with the East as a stabilizing factor able to secure Germany present and 
future. In this, they differentiated strongly from those that had and continued to 
perceive the East as an ideological menace that had to be obstructed at every juncture. 
The fact that a thawing of relation could in fact benefit Germany, even as a free-market 
capitalist nation, was one that did not occur to the older conservative structures of the 
CDU. 
Interestingly, Ostpolitik mirrored parts of Bismarcks Realpolitik. Whether this 
was by design or coincidence and whether the ideas of Bismarck influence Brandt is 
unknown. Even if it had, it would have been unlikely to be used as a primary example 
to arouse support for the new West-German foreign policy direction. Even after 1972 
when the first accomplishments of Germanys new direction became clear the 
mainstream CDU politicians continued on their previous course. While the CDU also 
saw internal division on this, its strong conservative majority continued to criticize the 
SPDs foreign policy, champion conservative German values utilize anti-communist 




support. In this, the CDU failed to read the signs of the time but it could still rely on 
stark support for the time being. This was reflected in the 1972 election that, although 
seeing a SPD victory, placed the CDU at 45 per cent of the popular vote. The CDUs 
perspective on foreign policy and its opposition to the SPDs attempts at 
Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung thus continued to arouse support of just under half of the 
German population of the time. 
The CDU, with its conservative mindset was unable to wrestle back control 
over the Bundestag. Likewise, it was unable to quench public debate on Germanys 
Nazi past. The blind reliance on Adenhauers formula ‘no-experiments’ meant that the 
CDU handicapped itself with limited vision and the fear of losing a large proportion of 
its voters. In this, one could make the argument that it was a blessing for Germany that 
the CDU remained opposed to Ostpolitik not simply for the sake of Democracy but 
because by doing so it kept conservative voters within its bounds, outside the influence 
of smaller and more radical parties. As we will see, a revival of National-Socialist 
thought via a new political party, the NPD, was not out of the question but in fact 
became reality. Had the CDU undergone a similar transformation as the FDP which 
lost nearly half of its voters after its liberal and conservative members clashed prior to 
the 1969 election, then a liberal change of course of the CDU might very well have 
prompted a stark support for more radical ideologies.  
Nevertheless, the CDUs attitude towards the East relied on an out-dated 




saying that communism facilitated a state of fake equality and de-facto dictatorship 
thus calling for a needed to be resisted. The problem lay in the CDUs overzealous 
approach that, at times, even led to it calling the SPD communist-collaborators. This 
was of course far from the truth. Where as the SPD did in fact have a small internal 
faction that was sympathetic to the Soviet Union, overall this was kept in check by 
those that saw communism as a perversion of the socialist ideal. Still, the CDU 
remained opposed to any fundamental change in foreign policy. 
 A look at a map will reveal the danger of such a dogma. Germanys 
geographical position between the east and west of Europe had always and continued to 
be, especially during the Cold War, a perilous one. Any war between the east and west 
was sure to play out on European soil or, more accurately, on German soil. Since 1871, 
unified Germany feared such a possibility and dreaded a two-front war. Much of 
Bismarckian foreign policy was focused on securing Germany by maintaining good 
relations with all neighbouring countries and via international alliances as well as the 
prevention of a strengthened France and a Franco-Russian alliance. While both played 
little role in the 1960s and 1970s, Germany was being left behind in international 
relations. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, relations between the west and east 
thawed. Detente began to stabilize international relations as both sides cautiously 
approached each other. The hard division into two camps was beginning to soften yet 




Nominally, good relations with the east would be of benefit to Germany. Not 
only would this stabilize the German-to-German politics, at the price of accepting the 
existence and legitimacy of the East German government, but also allow Germany to 
play a wider role in European politics and, crucially, lower its reliance on other western 
states. Distrust of Germany was high in the east, and the relations between both 
Germanises did not benefit either. On the contrary, the continued suspicion and no-
contact attitude facilitated a condition in which both sides would be hard pressed to 
work out urgent matters or prevent minor incidents at the borders to escalate into 
something much more horrific.   
To allow for such change, two barriers had to be broken down. The first one, 
domestic political resistance had been overcome with the electoral defeat of the CDU. 
Albeit a close victory, the SPD and FDP were well able to implement their vision of 
foreign policy. At this point the second barrier had to be overcome: Distrust of 
Germany in the East (esp. Poland) and the internal reluctance to accept responsibility 
for crimes committed during the Nazi period. With political and social change the 
resistance to prevent a historical debate was weakening but not completely eliminated. 
Large parts of the German population continued, as the Auschwitz trials and the 
support of the CDU showed, to oppose this debate. Distrust of Germany abroad was 
also substantial. The Nazi period had ensured that Germanys reputation in the east was 
next to zero. Poland vividly remembered German occupation, the deportation of Jews 
as well as the Warsaw Ghetto (and its crushed uprising). Other nations, some of whom 




the German occupation and its racist attitude towards the Slavic population. To break 
the image of the murdering, raping and destructive German would be a costly affair.  
4.3.3 East and West Germany 
While the SPD had also been a strong critic of the East German SED and had 
openly protested against the legitimacy of the SED rule, Willy Brandts’ cabinet was 
presented with a choice: continue the present non-cooperation with the East or face 
reality, recognise the Eastern government and begin a process of historical 
reconciliation. In 1970, Willy Brandt visited East Germany briefly and was welcomed, 
much to the embarrassment of Eastern authorities, by a euphoric crowd. The talks 
remained largely symbolic but thawed the ice. Various accords would follow until 1972 
when East and West Germany finally accepted the sovereignty of its counterpart thus 
setting the basis for future relations. 
4.4.  Territory and Ostpolitik  
As much as the rapprochement between the two Germanys marked a stern 
departure from the Hallstein Doctrine, it never furthered any discussion on historical 
matters. Yet, even before West Germany recognised the GDR it had made substantial 
efforts to recognise, amend and remember its past.  
When Willy Brandt visited Poland in 1970 much was on the table.  The trip 
was an historic one as much as it was the trial for Brandts Ostpolitik. A successful trip 
could go a long way in establishing new relations between Germany and Eastern 




opposition. After a small exchange concerning trade related matters in 1963, Poland 
insisted on an agreement over territorial matters, more accurately the German 
acceptance of the Oder Neisse Line, before any additional talks would be held. Holding 
introductory talks in February 1970, the German delegation under Brandt met their 
counterpart early November of the same year. Although having to formally accept the 
loss of what was essentially a quarter of Germanys Territory prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1939, the short visit went along smoothly. Ultimately, this would come to 
as no surprise. Poland was out to gain, if not by a normalization of its relationship with 
Germany then by having succeeded in eliminating its claim on the now Polish 
territories. A ratification of the treaty was thus in Polish interest. This interests aligned 
with those of Germanys, who saw in the treaty an opportunity to bridge the gap 
between it and the East. 
Brandts acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line was a risk. It had been 25 years 
since Germany lost World War Two and the German pubic was divided on the subject. 
Should the territorial concession bring forth no betterment in relations to the East then 
Brandt would have gambled off a large part of German territory essentially bringing 
down the concept of his Ostpolitik with it. Brandts politics and chancellery thus relied 
on the early success of his foreign policy. Committed, Brandt accepted the Oder Neisse 
as the official border between Germany (West and East) and Poland and thus allowed 




While now championing it as a required concession due to historical matters 
(Brandt commented that nothing would be lost that had not already been lost) even the 
Socialist Opposition in Germany had initially be against recognition of the Oder-Niesse 
Line. The recognition itself deeply divided Germany and German. Especially those that 
had been driven out of the old German territories felt betrayed. Germans also proved 
critical of Brandts other actions on the day of the signing. Having laid a wreath of 
flowers before the Warsaw Ghetto memorial Brandt sunk to his knees. With the now 
famous ‘Kniefall’ (kneeling), he would ask for forgiveness from the victim of Nazi 
Germany. Commenting on the Kniefall many years later, Brandt said:  
‘I felt that I had to make a gesture to ask and beg - even as one who had not 
been one of the staunched supporters of Hitler and his politics - for forgiveness for my 
people – even pray that we would be forgiven for what we had done.’
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 As highly controversial as the Oder Neisse Line acceptance was, the Kniefall 
would stir the emotions of many Germans. Many newspapers such as Die Zeit pictured 
Brandt kneeling on their cover
71
. Among those that supported historical reconciliation, 
Brandt earned much applause.
72
 Others saw him as a traitor who had not only degraded 
Germany but also sold it of to his communist co-conspirators. The popular SPIEGEL 
magazine asked: ‘Was Brandt allowed to kneel?’. 48 per cent of Germans did not think. 
Protests against Brandt emerged across Germany, some resorting to violence and 






which also resulted in the movement losing a lot of its credibility and support in 
Germany. 
Germans remained doubtful whether the Warsaw Accords would improve 
relations. Overall only 44 per cent believed that German – Polish relations would 
improve and that one would forgive each other. 36 per cent disagreed. Once again 
however, time was with those that hoped for a positive change, as this was a belief 
widely held by the young generation up to 44 year olds. The older, more conservative 
generations predominately believed that the recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line would 
do nothing to improve relations.
74
  
 Political opposition emerged too. Even after Brandts reception of the Peace 
Nobel Price in 1971, right leaning conservative voices failed to realise the substantial 
value of Brandts short moment of humility. The CDU/CSU remained strongly opposed 
to the accord.
75
 In 1972, a vote of no confidence was called. Brandt remained in office, 
barely, by two votes. Later, it would emerge that two CDU parliamentarians had been 
bribed by East Germany to not vote against Brandt.
76
 1972 also proved that Germans 
increasingly supported Brandts politics. In the general elections of 1972, with a record 
electoral outcome of 91.1 per cent,
77
 the SPD gained 46 per cent of the vote, the FDP 
recovered to 8 per cent and together thus comfortably won over the CDU/CSUs 45 per 
cent (Table 1). Many young SPD and FDP voters were those that had been part of the 
1968-1969 protests, now more mature and willing to actively influence policymaking 






Polish opinion about Germany improved substantially, also because the 
Kniefall was the last thing the Poles had expected. Author Lew Kopelew stated in 1977 
that Brandts act had purged his hatred for Germany and Germans.
79
 Marcel Reich 
Ranicki, survivor of the Warsaw Ghetto and later critically acclaimed German 
literature and media critic commented that it was Brandts act that had given him the 
long awaited confirmation that it had been appropriate to preserve his German 
nationality. Marek Edelmann, likewise survivor of the Ghetto, identifies the Kniefall as 
the moment that allowed him to once again trust Germans.
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 In Germany too, people would increasingly realise the merits of Brandt 
actions. Brandts electoral victory in 1972 proved to the world that Germans supported 
his politics of reconciliation. A young, vibrant Germany had emerged. Whereas 1954 
Germany shocked the world by winning the world cup in Bern/Switzerland and singing 
the Horst-Wessel Lied (Anthem of Nazi Germany) after its victory against the Ukraine,
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 the world cup in Germany in 1974 broadcasted a modern Germany to the world. 
From 1969 to 1972 the amount of Germans supporting the Oder-Neisse Line jumped 





 German Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung was not easy and commentators using 




conservative elements in Germany succeeded in obstructing any potential progress that 
could be made. These conservative elements weakened over time, as one generation 
passed to the other but as we have seen the debate only resurfaced during the 1960s. It 
is thus not very surprising that historical reconciliation only took off during the 1970s.  
Politicians certainly played a key role in preventing Germany to overcome its 
history sooner but this reflects upon society as a whole. If the majority of Germans had 
demanded an immediate discussion, one would most likely have occurred. As we have 
seen, this did not happen. Germans had pushed away the painful discussions 
surrounding guilt, crimes against humanity and the Holocaust as a whole. As society 
began to show increased support for historical reconciliation, so to did it more strongly 
appear in politics even allowing the Social Democrats to topple the CDU. The initial 
accomplishments of Ostpolitik, along with international recognition for German 
reconciliation efforts emphasized the success of the ‘new Germany’. When the Social 
Democrats won the 1972 elections, it also served as an confirmation of the desire by an 
increasing number of Germans to come clean and take responsibility for Germanys 
past.  
 It is here that I argue that Germany took a unique and distinct path. While at 
this point one could certainly have expected, similar to the eventual case of Japan, for 
everything to return to business as usual, Germany would suddenly emerge as a nation 
that would undergo a revolution in its very core. It would be during the late years of the 




through German society. Over the years this attitude would shape and became part of 
the German mind-set. Although for a just cause, it would have to slowly and painfully 
weave itself into the German psyche, facing both active and passive resistance along 
the way. In doing so, it played one of the most defining roles in helping Germany 
overcome the Nazi period, shape the remembrance and reconciliation with 
neighbouring states and the Jewish people.   
Of particular interest is that Germany adopted the taboo on anything remotely 
supportive of Nazism so readily. Set out by the Occupation force to complete eliminate 
Nazi Ideology, this taboo prevented a political resurfacing of National Socialism for 
over twenty years. As well as that, conservative voices managed to contain but never 
fully succeed in eliminating attempts to bring Germanys responsibility to the forefront 
of the public debate. This prevented German society from completely forgetting about 
its Nazi past and influence the perspective of the young post-war generation. Splitting 
Germany virtually in half on matters of historical reconciliation, the dialogue in society 
eventually allowed a Social liberal government to topple the conservative government 









Tables and Graphs:  
Table 1
83



















































                                                          
1
 Jennifer Lind, Sorry States – Apologies in International Politics, Corell University, 
New York: 2008, pp. 102 
2
 Kettenacker, Lothar, Germany since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1997, 
pp. 5, 
3
 Hosfeld, Rolf and Polking, Hermann, Die Deutschen 1945 – 1972 – Leben im 
doppelten Wirstschaftswunderland, Piper Verlag: Muenchen, 2006, pp. 65, 
4
 Kettenacker, pp. 17 
5
 Kettenacker, pp. 17, 
6
 Zolling, Peter, Deutsche Geschichte von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, Carl Hanser Verlag, 
Muenchen: 2005, pp. 233, 
7
 Marcuse, Harold, Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration 
Camp, 1933 – 2001, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2001, pp. 128,  
8
 Hosfeld, Rolf and Polking, Hermann, pp. 20 
9
 Zolling, pp. 234,  
10
 Merritt, Anna and Merritt, Richard, eds., Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The 
OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949, Urbana, University of Chicago Press: 1970, pp. 34 – 35,  
11 Cointet, Jean-Paul, Epuration legale: 400.000 dossier, moins de 800 morts’ , 




 Jan. 2015), 
12
 Hebert, Valerie Genevieve, Hitler’s Generals on Trial – The Last War Crimes 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, University Press of Kansas: 2010, pp. 39, 
13
 Kettenacker, pp. 17, 
14
 Vogt, Timothy, Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg 1945 – 
1948, Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 2000, pp. 8, 
15
 FitzGibbon, Constantine, Denazification, Michael Joseph, London: 1969, pp. 167,  
16
 Kettenacker, pp. 17, 
17
 Zolling, pp. 245,  
18
 Bower, Tom, Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, American and he Purging of Nazi 
Germany – A Pledge Betrayed, Granada, London: 1981, pp. 195, 
19
 Kettenacker, pp. 17, 
20
 Zolling, Peter, Deutsche Geschichte von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, Carl Hanser 
Verlag, Muenchen: 2005, pp. 234, 
21
 Buruma, Ian, The Wages of Guilt – Memories of War in Germany and Japan, 
Meridian – Penguin Books USA, New York: 1995, pp. 52 
22
 Merrit, Anna and Merrit, Richard, Public opinion in occupied Germany: the OMGUS 
surveys, 1945 – 1949, Urbana, University of Illinois Press: 1970, pp. 32,   
23
 Hosfeld, Rolf and Polking, Hermann, pp. 18,  
24




                                                                                                                                                           
25
 Institut fuer Demoskopie Allenbach, Ein Grosser Schritt in Richtung Normalitaet: 
Der Stand der Deutsch-Polnischen Beziehung – Ergebnisse Repraesentiver 
Bevoelkerungsumfragen in Deutschland und Polen, Stiftung fuer Deutsch-Polnische 
Zusammenarbeit, 2011, pp. 13, 
26
 Lind, pp. 105, 
27
 Lind, pp. 124, 
28
 Buruma, pp. 58 
29
 Ibid, pp. 63 
30
 Burchard, Michael, Der Generalplan Ost: Ein Finsteres Kapitel Berliner 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Humbolt-University, Berlin, 1997, available online at: 
http://gplanost.x-berg.de/sgplanost.html (4
th
 Jan. 2015),  
31
 Wulf Kansteiner, In pursuit of German memory: history television and politics after 
Auschwitz, Ohio University Press, pp. 223, 
32
 Wistrich, Robert, Who’s Who in Nazi Germany, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 75, 
33
 Eckhart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes and Mosche Zimmermann, Das Amt und 
die Vergangenheit – Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublic, 
Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010, pp. 19,  
34
 Die Zeit, Messerschmitt mit Davidstern, Issue 19, 2008, available at: 
http://www.zeit.de/2008/19/A-Israel2, (4
th
 Jan. 2015), 
35





 Jan. 2015), 
36
 Oppelland, Torsten, Domestic Political Developments I: 1949 – 69, in Larres, Klaus 
and Panayi, Panikos, The Federal Republic of Germany since 1949 – Politics, Society 
and Economy before and after Unification, Addison Wesley Longman Limited, New 
York: 1996, pp. 93, 
37




 Jan. 2015), 
38
 Winkler, York: Fluechtingsorganisationen in Hessen 1945 – 1954. BHE – 




 Jan. 2015), 
39
 Hosfeld, Peter and Polking, Hermann, pp. 206,  
40
 Maxwill, Peter, Hakenkreuze in der Bundesrepublik - Die Stunde der Schmierfinke, 
Spiegel Online, available at: www.spiegel.de/einestages/hakenkreuze-antisemitismus-
in-der-nachkriegszeit-a-1006236.html, (4
th
 Jan. 2015), 
41
 Kettenacker, pp. 140 – 141,  
42
 Burama, pp. 154, 
43
 Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltung zur Aufklaerung nationalsozialistischer 
Verbrechen, Besetzung, available at: http://www.zentrale-
stelle.de/pb/,Lde/Startseite/BESETZUNG, (4
th




                                                                                                                                                           
44
 Pendas, Devin, ‘I didn’t know what Auschwitz was’: The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial 
and the German Press, 1963 – 1965, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Volume 




 Dec. 2014), and Fritz Bauer Institut, Der 1. Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozess, 
Strafsache gegen Mulka u.a., 4 Ks/63, (20.12.1963 – 20.8.1965), Register der Zeugen 




 Jan. 2015), 
45
 Fritz Bauer Institut, Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust, Austellungsarchiv, 
Auschwitz-Prozess 4 Ks 2/63 Frankfurt am Main, Historisch-dokumentarische 
Ausstellung, Der Auschwitz-Prozess – Geschichte und Rezeption, available at: 
http://www.fritz-bauer-institut.de/auschwitz-prozess-ausstellung.html, (4
th
 Jan. 2015) 
and Wanders, Thomas and Werle, Gerhard, Ausschwitz vor Gericht – Voelkermord und 
bundesdeutsche Strafjustiz, Becksche Reihe, Muenchen: 1995, pp. 44, 
46
 Manuela Kanies, Ausschwitzprozess: Zeugenaussagen online veroeffentlicht, 




 Jan. 2015), 
47
 Wanders, Thomas and Werle, Gerhard, pp. 42,  
48
 Pendas, pp. 3,  
49
 Becker, Egon and Schmidt, Regina, Reaktionen auf Politsche Vorgaenge: Drei 
Meinungsstudien aus der Bundesrepublik, Band 19 von Frankfurter Beitraege zur 
Soziologie, Europaeische Verlagsanstalt: 1967, pp. 111,  
50
 Pendas, pp. 5, citing Wer weiss etwas ueber den Auschwitz-Prozess? Jugend nicht 
gut informiert, Die Welt, July 9, 1964,  
51
 Ebner, Christian, ‘Haben Sie von den Vergasungen gewusst?’ Stern Geschichte, 19
th
 
Jan. 2005, available at: http://www.stern.de/politik/geschichte/auschwitz-prozess-
haben-sie-von-den-vergasungen-gewusst-517896.html, (4
th
 Jan. 2015), 
52
 Kroger, Ulrich, Die Ahndung von NS-Verbrechen vor Westdeutschen Gerichte und 
ihre Rezeption in der deutschen Offentlichkeit 1958 bis 1965  unter besonderer 
Berucksichtigung von "Spiegel", "Stem", "Zeit", "SZ", "FAZ", "Welt",  "Bild", 
"Hamburger Abendblatt", "NZ" und "Neuem Deutschland", Ph.D dissertation, 
University of Hamburg: 1973, pp. 276, cited in Pendas, pp. 6 
53
 Becker, Egon and Schmidt, Regina, pp. 108,  
54
 Cesarani, David, Eichmann: His Life and Crimes, Vintage, London: 2005, pp. 334, 
55
 Zolling, pp. 285, 
56
 Hessicher Rundfunk, Das Ende des Schweigens – Der Frankfurter Auschwitz-
Prozess 1963-1965, Die Verjaehrungsdebatte, in Reden im Bundestag, Filmauschnitte 




 Jan. 2015),  
57




                                                                                                                                                           
58
 Both extracts of Hildegard Bischoff and Carl Krauch can be found in Hessicher 
Rundfunk, Das Ende des Schweigens – Der Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozess 1963-1965, 
Auschwitz vor Gericht, in Der Prozess, Filmauschnitte ‘Nichts gesehen, nichts 






 Interview with students and teachers from the Elizabethen School Frankfurt found in 
Hessicher Rundfunk, Das Ende des Schweigens – Der Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozess 
1963-1965, Auschwitz und wir, in Schuld und Verantworung, Filmauschnitte ‘Gericht 






 Marcuse, pp. 7, 
61
 Kettenacker, pp. 142, and Zolling, pp. 298,  
62
 Die Welt, SPD will die ganze Macht – Wortgefecht um die Dauer der Grossen 
Koalition, 15. November 1968, Nr. 46, available online: 
http://www.zeit.de/1968/46/spd-will-die-ganze-macht, (4
th
 Jan. 2015), 
63




 Jan. 2015), 
64
 Siekmeier, Mathias and Larres, Klaus, Domestic Political Developments II: 1969-90, 
in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, The Federal Republic of Germany since 1949 – 
Politics, Society and Economy before and after Unification, Addison Wesley Longman 
Limited, New York: 1996, pp. 101 - 104 
65
 Zolling, pp. 299,  
66
 Oppelland, pp. 92, 
67
 Lind, pp. 127, 
68
 Behrens, Alexander, ‘Durfte Brandt knien?’ – Der Kniefall und der deutsch-




 Jan. 2015), 
69
 Zolling, pp. 300,  
70
 Translated by author from Phoenix Documentary, available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2rdiUDJYMwM, (4
th
 Jan. 2015),  
71





 Zolling, pp. 305,  
73
 See Phoenix Documentary, 
74
 Institut fuer Demoskopie, pp. 11,  
75
 Die Zeit, Die Union sagt Nein, Die Zeit, Issue 50, 1970, avalailble at: 
http://www.zeit.de/1970/50/index, (4
th
 Jan. 2015) 
76
 Wiegrefe, Klaus, Ostpolitk: How East Germany tried to undermine Willy Brandt, 
Spiegel Online, 8
th








 Jan. 2015) 
77
 Hosfeld, Rolf and Polking, Hermann, pp. 108,  
78
 Zolling, pp. 306,  
79
 Die Zeit, Lew Kopelew: Bekenntnisse eines Sowjetbürgers, 4.2.1977.  
80





 Institut fuer Demoskopie Allenbach, pp. 13, 
83




 Jan. 2015) 
84




 Jan. 2015) 
85




 Jan. 2015) 
86




 Jan. 2015) 
87




 Jan. 2015) 
88




 Jan. 2015) 
89




 Jan. 2015) 
 
